(Text: Michael Wegerich)
Before entering combat, the principles of employment of the frontal and fighter aviation provided for dispersing the forces (distributing them over many locations to make it more difficult for the enemy to reconnoitre and destroy one's own forces).
For this purpose, besides the main base airfields, manoeuvre, reserve and landing airfields with varying infrastructure were provided. Manoeuvre airfields were developed field airfields with a grass or asphalt runway, narrow paved or unpaved taxiways and central and dispersed parking areas (parking areas distributed over the whole airfield, prepared for camouflage and partly offering splinter protection).
Motorway sections, well-built and obstacle-free roads, and sports and GST airfields were provided as reserve and landing airfields.
The operational documents of fighter wing JG-1 laid down that one fighter squadron was to operate from the main base (Cottbus airfield until 1981, Holzdorf airfield from 1982), one squadron from the Alteno field airfield near Luckau and one squadron from an unknown manoeuvre airfield (we expected the Ruhland motorway section or a GST airfield). The aircraft were designed for landings on grass and motorways. Accordingly, all the support equipment and the landing and command systems were mobile too.
To ensure rapid deployment and assumption of combat and command readiness, a deployment squadron had to be designated in the combat documents and deployment had to be practised.
The deployment squadron of JG-1 at Holzdorf was my squadron, the 2nd fighter squadron, which I led as squadron commander (from 1985 to 1987). Every pilot had to be able to land at Alteno. On combat flying days, exercises or according to the annual plan, small groups of aircraft (1–2 flights, 4–8 aircraft) were deployed to the field airfield.
As part of the training for proficiency class I, every pilot had to have landed at "other airfields". This included the field airfield. At the same time this was practice or training for "take-off and landing on grass runways". Later, when the touchdown points were asphalted because the turf at the touchdown point had been badly damaged by frequent landings, limiting use of the runway, the field airfield could no longer be used for training in landing on grass. So at the end of the 1970s, on the way to proficiency class I, I landed at the field airfield under blue skies and sunshine, i.e. in "simple weather conditions" (VMC), by the book from the circuit at 500 m, first with an instructor in the MiG-21UM, later in the MiG-21SPS. If you did not know the location of the airfield and some landmarks exactly, the field airfield was hard to find. It could be anywhere where a larger green area was bordered by forest on three sides.
There were plenty of such areas in Lusatia. You had to fly on a heading of 260 north past Lübbenau, exactly over the substation at the motorway, and then you recognised the field airfield. But the last 4 km to touchdown were unusual too. There were no clear orientation lines in the landing direction (a cutting through the forest or a clearly visible long runway). You flew over pine trees until a few hundred metres before touchdown. The familiar wide concrete runway for judging flare height was missing. The landing quality was correspondingly variable. Not every landing was a soft one. Added to that was the excitement of the first landings at the field airfield. Everything was smaller and seemed narrower, as the trees reached much closer to the flight operating areas.
Many months had passed since my last landing at Alteno when, by then a first lieutenant in the 1st fighter squadron, I was allowed to take part in an exercise.
The squadron had the task, after a combat mission, of deploying "covertly" (under radio silence and at low level, so that the enemy would not notice the shift of forces) to Alteno and conducting further combat operations from the manoeuvre or field airfield. The field airfield had meanwhile been manned by a flying control officer, and a small group of technical personnel was expecting us. But the weather was not at its best. The solid high stratus was less of a problem, but it was murky and hazy below the clouds. The specified minimum visibility for approaching the field airfield was 4 km. In fact we had 2–3 km visibility to the left and right. So for the "old hands" visibility greater than 4 km – the task can be carried out. We took off as a squadron in pairs, flew a standard route and formed tactical groups to receive and engage target groups. After about 30–40 minutes the squadron's flights returned to the calculated line for the approach to Cottbus airfield, broke up their formation, and the individual aircraft took up landing intervals for a straight-in landing. Everything was carried out as if the aircraft were going to land. The pilots took up the heights and speeds specified for the landing approach, reported established on the landing course, flaps and landing gear extended, and the flying control officer at Cottbus cleared them to land. Everyone flew the approach down to 50 m and then levelled off in order to fly to the field airfield under radio silence. The plan was to enter the southern circuit and land on a heading of 260. When, by heading, time and with the help of Alteno's outer locator, I entered the southern circuit on a heading of 40 degrees, I recognised no landmark and had no idea where the airfield was. From 50 m everything looked unfamiliar, and in the poor visibility I doubted I would ever find the field airfield. I did not have a good feeling, and nobody could help me without breaking radio silence. Fortunately I saw Major Weiß's aircraft flying about 2 km ahead of me. Since passing over Cottbus airfield I had seen him most of the time flying ahead of me at about 2–3 km, just at the limit of visibility. Now my only thought was not to lose sight of Major Weiß. I increased engine rpm and reduced the distance to him to about 1–1.5 km, so that I could see his aircraft reliably. When I saw him extend his landing gear, I also operated the gear lever and extended the flaps. I turned onto the new headings at the same points as he did and kept my eyes on him – and not on the flight instruments. I had not always kept exactly to the specified parameters. That did not seem important to me now; I just must not get too slow. We had taken up the landing course and I still did not know exactly where we were. Major Weiß began his descent and I followed him with a corresponding delay. Only when Major Weiß was just short of the flare point did I recognise Alteno airfield and was relieved. I checked my parameters, corrected rpm and glide angle and was able to "put down" a reasonably good landing. Only now, during the rollout, did all the tension fall away from me. Everyone had landed safely, and nobody had noticed my uncertainty on the approach to Alteno. When we had parked our aircraft and gathered in front of them, we happily went over some episodes of the interception.
By then a young captain, I was given the task of flying flying control officer Lieutenant Colonel Seeger to Alteno in a MiG-21UM from the front cockpit and supporting him there at the mobile tower as his assistant, as several flights were to operate from Alteno that day. This time we had blue skies, unlimited visibility and no ordered radio silence. But again I could not expect help from the ground on the approach to Alteno, as the flying control officer was sitting behind me "watching my every move". I called "Arno Start" on the preset channel. The technician at the control point, an old warrant officer, confirmed good reception and that the field airfield was clear. I told him that we were approaching to land. We had not yet landed when we already heard the first flight on the frequency, intending to land at the field airfield. These aircraft were returning from their mission 10–15 minutes earlier than planned. While still in the taxiing MiG-21UM, the flying control officer cleared the approach for the break. The technician at the control point was not authorised to use the air-ground radio except to check transmission and reception quality.
On arrival at the parking spot, after the engine had been shut down, Lieutenant Colonel Seeger jumped out of the UM over the wing and ran across the airfield towards the control point. I remained seated with the radio switched on and cleared the flight to break over the airfield and approach to land. The first of the flight was already almost at flare height when flying control officer Lieutenant Colonel Seeger took over control of the flights from the control point and was already clearing the second flight to approach Alteno.
Now I finally switched off the UM's radio, left the aircraft and handed it over to the "technicians", who had meanwhile hurried over, just as surprised by the early arrival of the aircraft. From the roof of the control point, with telephone and microphone, I coordinated the flight movements at the field airfield. At dusk, after the last MiG had left the field airfield, we returned to Cottbus in our UM.
JG-1 had meanwhile moved from Cottbus to Holzdorf, and I led the 2nd squadron as squadron commander. On a combat flying day, a flight of the 2nd squadron and other aircraft of the wing were to fly from Alteno. The squadron's chief engineer put together a detachment with vehicles and personnel for the engineering support of the aircraft at Alteno. The detachment left the wing before the start of flying. A flying control officer was dropped at Alteno by An-2.
After intercepting air targets, I led the flight to the Alteno field airfield, and after a nice break four good landings followed. That was not a matter of course, as three young first lieutenants were following me to Alteno in a combat aircraft for the first time. When we arrived at the planned parking area, there was no sign of the technical personnel, of ladders for getting out or of anything else that was needed. Only soldiers of the field airfield detachment came with large fuel trucks, but they could not refuel the MiGs. I called to one of them to put the chock from the fuel truck in front of the wheels of my MiG, because only then could I get out over the wing without a ladder. I looked to see whether there were further chocks on the other vehicles, had the aircraft secured and the pilots could finally get out. Then I decided to prepare the MiGs for a turnaround as far as we could. But not everyone his own aircraft; instead one was to refuel all four, another to top up compressed air and another oxygen.
First Lieutenant Krickemeier asked what he should refuel first, the drop-tank or the tank on top. I did not know either. I could not give any hints or advice on how to carry out the work. The last instruction in turnaround preparation had been a long time ago and not much had "stuck".
First Lieutenant Krickemeier began refuelling. He was dissatisfied and told the soldier to put more pressure on the fuel line. He gave the hose full pressure. As the strainer was still in the filler neck, most of the fuel sprayed back out of the opening due to the back pressure and poured over First Lieutenant Krickemeier. Parts of his flying suit were soaked with fuel and he smelled like a petrol barrel. We were all now one experience richer. The further work went without problems. Meanwhile I looked for a telephone to enquire about our technical detachment. I learned that a truck had broken down and replacement was coming soon. Shortly before my young pilots had finished, the technical personnel arrived, took over the aircraft and completed the work. We went for our second breakfast. There was bockwurst with Saxon mustard, mixed with the constant smell of fuel from Krickemeier's flying suit.
As the deployment squadron, we had to be constantly ready (regardless of the time of day or night) to deploy with the entire squadron to Alteno or another field airfield and to operate from there for several days or weeks.
An exercise had begun. All 12 aircraft were combat-ready and manned. It was now 10 p.m. Readiness state 1 had been lifted and the live missiles removed on instructions. That meant possible night missions or flights in the early morning hours. The squadron command post was still fully manned, but personnel not needed went to rest, i.e. looked for a quiet spot in the bunker or in the hardened aircraft shelter. At about 11.30 p.m. the telephone rang in the command post. The wing commander, Colonel Kernchen, came on the line and said: "Attention, task: you will deploy with the entire squadron to the Alteno field airfield and report to me combat readiness of 12 aircraft and assumption of readiness state 1 with one flight at the field airfield within three hours; it is exactly 23:30. Repeat!" I repeated the order, and the other end had already hung up. Questions were not allowed. They were superfluous anyway. The order corresponded exactly to what we should have been ready for according to the wing order. Only we had never practised such a deployment with the entire squadron and with such a short time limit, let alone at night.
The squadron manual, however, contained all command steps and actions planned and laid down with X-times in order to be combat-ready with 12 MiG-21s at the field airfield within 3 hours. Combat-ready meant all aircraft refuelled and fully armed (including live missiles). We had no time reserves for the deployment. The advance and rear detachments had to drive 80 km along country roads through the night. That took most of the time.
I called my squadron leadership together and gave them the task. The squadron's chief engineer divided the technical personnel into an advance and a rear detachment. The advance detachment opened the hardened vehicle shelters in which the trailers with the already loaded ground equipment stood. As the deployment squadron we had a double set of the most important ground equipment, constantly loaded ready for transport. The corresponding trucks from the airfield engineering battalion, ordered according to the combat manual to support the squadron's deployment, arrived on time. After about 30 minutes the advance detachment's vehicle column was ready to leave. My chief engineer took command of the advance detachment and drove off into the night. The rear detachment was led by the chief of staff. It prepared the aircraft for start-up without haste. The pilots were briefed by my deputy for flying training, Lieutenant Colonel Deckert, and went to the aircraft. At about 0:30 a.m. we started the aircraft and took off into the black sky. Some were assigned targets by the command post. Others only flew a standard route. After about 60 minutes of flying time we approached Alteno for a night landing. Visibility was good. We could see the illuminated industrial plants with the distinctive chimneys of Lübbenau very well. From the northern edge of Lübbenau you only had to follow the needle on a heading of 260 and you saw the runway lights. This time the forest was not confusing, as it was black like the whole landscape around the field airfield. The ground floodlights illuminated the touchdown point as at the home airfield, so the landing posed no particular difficulty. At the parking area the advance detachment was already waiting for us. It had arrived only a few minutes before us. There was hectic activity at the parking areas. Half the personnel now had to prepare 12 aircraft. There were not even 60 minutes left. In the dark, with only torches, the aircraft had to be refuelled and checked. In addition, missiles had to be loaded. The pilots were already waiting at the aircraft while the missiles were being loaded, in order to assume readiness state 1 immediately after preparation was complete, i.e. the pilot sits strapped into the aircraft, the start cart is running and the crew is ready to start the aircraft. Meanwhile I sat in the bunker to receive the readiness state 1 reports from the flight technician. 3 pilots were in readiness state 1. At exactly 2:30 a.m. I called the wing commander and reported "12 aircraft combat-ready at Alteno field airfield, 4 of them in readiness state 1, time 2:30". In reply I heard a grumpy thank you, and the conversation was over. Meanwhile the fourth had also reported in readiness state 1. It was not long before the order came to unload the missiles and launch 4 aircraft. It was to be a long summer night at the Alteno field airfield.